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AMIDST THE WALKING DEAD: JUDICIAL AND
NONJUDICIAL APPROACHES FOR ERADICATING ZOMBIE
MORTGAGES†
ABSTRACT
The collapse of the residential housing market in 2007 brought with it a
wave of foreclosures. Subprime borrowers, who were once elated by loans they
secured from lenders, suddenly found themselves strangled by the predatory
terms of their newfound loans and ultimately became unable to pay their
outstanding loan balance. Amidst a growing number of residential
foreclosures, lenders discovered the financial downside of foreclosing on
residential properties—though this realization often surfaced after the
foreclosure proceeding had commenced—and began to delay, or halt,
foreclosure sales altogether. These purposeful maneuvers by lenders resulted
in borrowers’ continued legal liability for a residential property, a property
which borrowers believed they had lost as a result of the lender’s foreclosure;
in other words, a “zombie mortgage.”
This Comment analyzes the different circumstances under which lenders
can foster the creation of zombie mortgages. Particularly, this Comment
focuses on stalled and incomplete residential foreclosure sales and failures to
execute deeds of sale, tactics which serve to maintain legal liability of the
mortgaged property on a borrower. Notwithstanding a lender’s right to
foreclose on residential property to satisfy the obligations that it is owed under
a promissory note, this Comment argues that strategic delays in completing a
foreclosure sale entitle state courts and legislatures to either (1) force a lender
to complete a sale or (2) divest a lender from both its right to foreclose and its
security interest. Though some other solutions for zombie mortgages have been
proposed, this Comment urges courts and legislatures to look outside criminal
sanctions and nuisance abatement actions when developing strategies to
eradicate zombie mortgages. Through judicial and legislative intervention,
lenders would be incentivized to complete the foreclosure proceeding, or risk
losing their security interests in the mortgaged property.
† This Comment received the 2015 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and
Writing.

CLARK GALLEYSPROOFS3

796

2/29/2016 1:42 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:795

INTRODUCTION
Like many homeowners in the United States, Joseph Keller fell behind on
his mortgage payments and found himself subject to a foreclosure judgment.1
Once Keller received notice of the foreclosure sale, he and his family packed
up their belongings and moved out, assuming that they would never “have
anything to do with the house again.”2 Unfortunately, Keller was wrong.
About two months after Keller’s receipt of the auction notice, “[his] bank
filed to dismiss the foreclosure judgment and the order of sale.”3 The result
was a “zombie mortgage”—a property that remained in Keller’s name as if the
foreclosure proceedings had never started.4 Keller was also legally liable for
back taxes, sewer fees, waste removal, and the overall maintenance of a
decrepit property that he had not occupied in years and thought was no longer
his own.5 Though abandoned foreclosures were once rare, the creation of
zombie mortgages—like the one held by Keller—has been increasingly
replicated in several cities across the nation, particularly in cities struggling
economically after the downfall of the housing market.6
Despite the fact that lenders have several options to avoid foreclosure,
including home retention workouts or helping borrowers refinance their loans,
many of them choose to begin foreclosure proceedings while they are still
negotiating with borrowers.7 Throughout this process, lenders engage in an

1

Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The Latest Foreclosure Horror: The Zombie Title, REUTERS (Jan. 10,
2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usa-foreclosures-zombies-idUSBRE9090G92
0130110.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 For a more complete definition of the term “zombie mortgage” as is used in this Comment, see infra
Part I.B.
5 Conlin, supra note 1 (“Then the tax collector started sending Keller notices about mounting back
taxes, sewer fees and bills for weed and waste removal.”); Ilyce Glink, “Zombie” Foreclosures Hit
Ex-Homeowners, CBS: MONEYWATCH (Apr. 2, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/zombieforeclosures-hit-ex-homeowners/ (“Hundreds of thousands of homes in the U.S. are now labeled as “zombie”
foreclosure. That’s when the owner of the foreclosed home leaves only to find out years later that he or she
still legally owns and is on the hook for property taxes and other fees.”).
6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 11-93, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: ADDITIONAL
MORTGAGE SERVICER ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF ABANDONED
FORECLOSURES 1, 14, 23 (2010).
7 Id. at 10 & n.12.
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equity analysis “to decide whether to foreclose on a loan or conduct a
charge-off in lieu of a foreclosure.”8
Whether it was a judicial or a nonjudicial foreclosure, lenders increasingly
began to delay the foreclosure proceedings after either obtaining a judgment
from the court for the sale of the property, after setting a date for the auction of
the same, or even after the auction occurred.9 By ceasing all additional steps to
complete the foreclosure proceeding, lenders attempted—and continue to
attempt—to bypass legal liability for maintaining the property while retaining
the ability to foreclose on the same mortgaged property in the future.10 More
importantly, title to such property remained with the borrower given that the
mortgaged property was never actually sold.11
Though many scholars have proposed mediation, nuisance abatement, and
criminal sanction strategies,12 these proposed solutions have not been sufficient
on their own to eradicate zombie mortgages in the residential real estate
arena.13 Therein, the solution to the zombie mortgage crisis lies in analyzing a
lender’s right to foreclose and subsequently using judicial and legislative
approaches to transform that right into a legal obligation to finalize the
foreclosure sale it voluntarily commenced.
In Part I, this Comment presents a brief explanation of judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. It also presents the definition of zombie
mortgage, which will be used throughout this Comment. Part II then analyzes
the rights of the lender, both when the borrower is in possession of the
mortgaged property and when the property is unoccupied. Part II concludes by
exploring the circumstances under which a lender’s rights can become
obligations.
8

Id. at 15.
Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures Are Re-entering the Market
Through Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 25, 34–43 (2013); see infra Part I.B.
10 Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and
Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1186–87.
11 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME FORECLOSURE
PROCESS 5, 16 (2011), http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/SAR%20Home%20Foreclosure%20Process_0.pdf
(“Until title passes to the foreclosure sale purchaser, the homeowner typically remains liable.”); Fox, supra
note 9, at 42 (describing a borrower’s personal story when the bank canceled the sheriff sale, “presumably
because it determined that the home was not worth selling,” and the property remained in the borrower’s
name).
12 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1169, 1187–233.
13 See generally id. (discussing the mechanics of civil proceedings for nuisance abatement and individual
criminal nuisance actions).
9
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Next, Part III outlines the foundation that will underpin the solutions
proposed in this Comment. Though a lender has a right to foreclose on the
mortgaged property to satisfy the sum owed under a promissory note,
purposeful delays in conducting such foreclosure sale could trigger judicial use
of equitable discretion. Part III also discusses current legislative loopholes that
permit lenders to delay the foreclosure sale indefinitely. This Part demonstrates
that state judicial and legislative branches can interfere with a lender’s right to
foreclose if such lender’s exercise of the right has been unduly delayed.
Lastly, Part IV draws from the judicial and legislative intervention analysis
discussed in Part III to recommend solutions for the zombie mortgage crisis.
Though different solutions are presented for judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure states, the underlying goal of eradicating zombie mortgages can be
accomplished in both types of jurisdictions.
I. ZOMBIE MORTGAGES
Zombie mortgages evolved from three primary sources: the subprime
lending crisis, lenders’ subsequent discoveries that foreclosures on residential
mortgages would often be more costly than the value of the property, and
lenders’ desires to avoid legal ownership and liability of the property.14 This
Part explains the differences between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures and
the underlying characteristics that subject them to different zombie mortgage
solutions. This Part then defines the term zombie mortgage for purposes of this
Comment and identifies the stages during which a zombie mortgage can arise.
A. Judicial and Nonjudicial Foreclosures
A zombie mortgage can exist in both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure
states.15 A judicial foreclosure jurisdiction is one in which a lender must go
through the court system to foreclose on a residential property.16 Such a lender
is usually required to give a borrower notice before filing the foreclosure
complaint.17 After a borrower has had time to respond, the lender can serve the

14

See Fox, supra note 9, at 39–43.
For a detailed overview of the different foreclosure processes, see FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra
note 11.
16 Frank Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure
States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 343 (2011).
17 Id.
15
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complaint.18 If the borrower does not respond to the complaint, then “the
[presiding] court authorizes a foreclosure sale.”19 In the event a borrower does
file a response to the complaint, the case proceeds to trial.20 Nevertheless, most
judicial foreclosures of residential mortgages are “not contested and result in
default judgments against the homeowner” because courts are only obligated to
look at the sufficiency of a lender’s filings.21
Alternatively, a nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdiction—also referred to as a
power-of-sale foreclosure jurisdiction22—is one in which a lender only needs
to comply with notice and advertisement requirements before it can auction the
property for sale.23 The lender does not need the permission of the court to
commence the sale. In nonjudicial foreclosure states, the burden is on the
borrower to commence judicial action if it wishes to stop the sale.24
Approximately thirty-three states and the District of Columbia are
classified as predominantly nonjudicial, while seventeen states are classified as
predominantly judicial.25 In all states that permit nonjudicial foreclosure, a
18

Id.
Id.
20 Id.
21 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 11.
22 To have the option of a nonjudicial foreclosure, both the loan documents and the respective state must
permit the process. GARRY M. GRABER, CRAIG T. LUTTERBEIN & STEVEN W. WELLS, UNDERSTANDING
FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY (2014), LexisNexis (database updated May 15, 2014) (“[A] power of sale
foreclosure is usually effectuated pursuant to a private power of sale contained in a deed of trust (although
some states do authorize power of sale foreclosures pursuant to a provision in a mortgage).”); KARL B.
HOLTZSCHUE, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY § 36.07 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2015) (1987)
(explaining that “[m]any states have adopted statutes dealing with deeds of trust, which prescribe the power of
sale as one of the regular incidents of the trust deed relationship” and that in most states “the power of sale
must be conferred by clear language in the mortgage”). The loan documents that permit nonjudicial
foreclosures often involve a deed of trust as the security interest to the promissory note, as compared to the
security instrument used for judicial foreclosures. GRABER ET AL., supra, at 5.
23 Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 343. The lender needs to send notice to the homeowner and place an
advertisement in the local paper before proceeding with a foreclosure sale. Some argue that vague notification
factors, handled by government-subsidized servicers, are unconstitutional because they deprive the homeowner
of due process. For an interesting discussion on whether nonjudicial foreclosures as a component of state
action are unconstitutional, see Florence Wagman Roisman, Protecting Homeowners From Non-Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgages Held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 125 (2014).
24 Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 343.
25 Id. at 350. Professor Alexander’s article classifies nonjudicial foreclosure states as Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 350 n.25. But cf. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 19–21 fig.12
19
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lender “always has the option of pursuing foreclosure through a judicial
process.”26
B. Understanding What a Zombie Mortgage Is and When One Occurs
The term “zombie mortgage” refers to a mortgage on a residential property
for which enforcement of foreclosure proceedings were commenced but never
finalized—plus the externalities such an action creates.27 Although zombie
mortgages produce numerous problems, this Comment focuses on the
uncertainty surrounding ownership of the property in the period of time after
foreclosure proceedings have commenced and after the lender has ceased
enforcing its rights to the security interest. As a result of these initiated
foreclosure actions, zombie mortgage victims believe they have lost ownership
of the mortgaged property, but they are in fact still the legal owners of record
several years later.
Accordingly, zombie mortgages result from a series of lender-created
scenarios, all which serve to maintain legal ownership and liability of the
property in a borrower.28 In judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, a zombie
mortgage exists in two circumstances: (1) when a lender commences a
foreclosure sale by filing a foreclosure action with a court, gets a judgment in
its favor granting the foreclosure sale, but then fails to conduct the sale; or
(2) when a lender conducts the foreclosure sale but elects not to execute or

(distinguishing North Dakota as primarily judicial and the District of Columbia and West Virginia as primarily
nonjudicial).
26 Alexander, supra note 16, at 350.
27 This Comment defines zombie mortgage in a different manner than the public currently uses it by
focusing on the lender’s refusal to enforce its right of foreclosure after it voluntarily commenced such
proceedings. Cf. Fox, supra note 9, at 30–43 (combining the terms “[a]bandoned foreclosure, bank walkaway,
‘zombie title’ and ‘limbo loan’ . . . to describe a situation where a homeowner is in default, but the foreclosure
does not proceed in the normal fashion to the eventual sale of the [property]” and identifying several stages
during which the zombie mortgage can arise, but failing to distinguish between a zombie mortgage that occurs
prior to the foreclosure sale and one that occurs after the sale but before recordation). This Comment’s
definition encompasses a specific set of zombie mortgages but excludes those that are created through
borrower abandonment—before the lenders’ decision to foreclose on the mortgaged property. See Conlin,
supra note 1 (referring to situations where the bank walks away as a “zombie title” but not distinguishing the
different points in time at which the lender can refuse to complete the foreclosure). But see Johnson, supra
note 10, at 1186 (identifying a lender’s refusal to record deeds in their name after the foreclosure period as
“toxic titles” that create dubious chain of legal ownership).
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 6, at 15; FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at
16; Fox, supra note 9, at 31–32.
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record its foreclosure deed after it is the winning bidder at its own auction.29 In
nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions, the main concern is with lenders’
decision not to execute and record the deed of sale to finalize the sale.
The first circumstance—a kind of “pre-auction zombie”—is created when a
lender commences a foreclosure proceeding but ceases all attempts to conduct
the sale after the entry of judgment authorizing the foreclosure action.30 The
foreclosure process “usually starts with a summons and a complaint and
requires a court order prior to the sale of the mortgaged property.”31 A lender is
then required to conduct service of process on a borrower, though the
requirements for this kind of notice vary by state.32 Additionally, lenders will
often send notice to a borrower informing him or her that foreclosure
proceedings will commence along with a demand to vacate the premises.33 If a
borrower does not respond to the foreclosure complaint, or a lender is
successful at trial, the presiding court enters a judgment of record in favor of a
lender authorizing the sale.34
Upon receiving notice from the lender, the borrower vacates the property,
often believing that such property will be sold and that the sale will transfer
legal ownership of the property to another party—relieving the borrower from
further legal liability and ownership of the property.35 Contrary to the
borrower’s beliefs, at some point after an entry of the order of sale but prior to
the actual sale of the property, the lender conducts an equity analysis to justify

29

See Fox, supra note 9, at 39–43 (defining stalled foreclosures and foreclosures abandoned after
judgment but before sale). This Comment is concerned with the effects of a lender filing a foreclosure action,
obtaining a judgment in its favor, and then ceasing all attempts to complete it.
30 Id. at 39.
31 Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach,
45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 699 (2008).
32 Id. at 700 & n.110; see FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 10–11.
33 David P. Weber, Zombie Mortgages, Real Estate, and the Fallout for the Survivors, 45 N.M. L. REV.
37, 42 (2014).
34 Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 343.
35 Raymond L. Pianka, Zombie Mortgages and Zombie Titles, CLEV. MUN. CT. HOUSING DIVISION,
http://www.clevelandmunicipalcourt.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/cleveland-municipalcourt-zombie-mortgages-and-zombie-titles.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). Transfer of ownership in the
property should not be confused with the borrower’s obligation to pay back the sum stated in the promissory
note. See id. Though the borrower might not be legally liable for the property, taxes, and other costs incurred
after the sale is completed, the borrower, per the loan agreement documents, is often still liable for the
outstanding balance of the loan. See id.
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halting any and all attempts to finalize a foreclosure sale that will not yield
sufficient proceeds to pay the borrower’s outstanding loan balance.36
A lender will typically fail to send notice to borrowers informing them that
it has stopped or delayed the foreclosure proceedings, and the foreclosure sale
never occurs.37 Though lenders’ failure to notify borrowers of their decision to
cease foreclosure proceedings has been criticized, there is no present legal
obligation to provide notice of such decision to a borrower.38 Meanwhile, the
property remains under the borrower’s name and he or she remains legally
liable and subject to property taxes, maintenance fees, and other costs related
to the outstanding mortgage even though the home is legally unoccupied and
often has been for several years.39
Before it decides to not continue with the foreclosure proceeding, a lender
engages in an equity analysis to determine whether a foreclosure sale will yield
a sum sufficient to cover the outstanding debt plus foreclosure costs.40 If a
lender’s equity analysis indicates that the “[cost] of foreclosure exceed[s] the
expected proceeds from selling the property,” the lender will generally cease
all attempts to complete the foreclosure sale.41 Often, a lender makes this
decision before initiating the foreclosure sale, but “in many cases [does] not
discover that foreclosure would not be financially beneficial until after
initiating the process.”42 By starting the foreclosure proceeding and later
deciding not to conduct the sale, a lender can charge-off the loan and can “take
advantage of insurance, tax, and accounting benefits from the monetary loss
without the financial obligations of ownership.”43
In contrast to pre-auction zombie mortgages in judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions, the obvious component missing in a nonjudicial foreclosure is
judicial oversight.44 The absence of judicial hearings at the outset of a
foreclosure process only means that a borrower has to be proactive and

36

Id.; Weber, supra note 33, at 42.
See Fox, supra note 9, at 41–43.
38 Weber, supra note 33, at 42.
39 Id. at 42–43.
40 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 6, at 15.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 14.
43 Fox, supra note 9, at 31 n.23; Weber, supra note 33, at 40–41.
44 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 12-34, VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING NUMBER INCREASES
COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES 5 (Nov. 2011).
37
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actively seek judicial intervention.45 Without a borrower’s request for judicial
intervention prior to the foreclosure sale, the typical nonjudicial foreclosure
process does not call for a hearing until the completion of the sale, if at all.46
The second circumstance—a kind of post-auction zombie—occurs when
the lender fails to execute and record the deed of sale after the foreclosure sale
is conducted.47 Once a sale occurs, the execution and recordation of the deed of
sale is necessary to perfect the legal transfer of the property from a borrower to
a foreclosure sale buyer.48 After the sale, liability for maintenance, taxes, and
other costs associated with homeownership transfers to the new owner.49
Should few bidders appear at a lender’s auction sale, the lender may
become the highest bidder and, consequently, the property’s new owner,
making the residential property real estate owned (REO).50 Ownership of the
property by a foreclosure sale purchaser shifts future legal title and liability
from the borrower onto the purchaser.51 If the property is unoccupied or legally
uninhabited, either through the borrower’s independent decision or as a result
of the lender’s notice of impending foreclosure,52 a foreclosure sale
purchaser’s ownership of this property also imposes on it a duty to clean up the
property and resolve any nuisance, environmental, and health hazard issues
associated with the property.53 Unsurprisingly, a lender has an incentive to
45 Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time
Bomb?, 4 WM. & M. BUS. L. REV. 111, 141 (2013).
46 Id.
47 See Pianka, supra note 35.
48 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1186 n.98.
49 Cf. Conlin, supra note 1 (“Banks say that because they are not the legal owners of these homes, they
aren’t required to maintain them, pay taxes on them, or take any legal responsibility for them. Homeowners
legally own their properties until the day of the sale. And it’s not until that day, the banks point out, that a
homeowner’s name vanishes from the title.”).
50 Weber, supra note 33, at 44 (noting that when the home becomes property of the lender, it “is known
in the trade as real estate owned (REO) property”).
51 Once a property becomes an REO, such lender is deemed to have possession and control of the
mortgaged property. As such, a lender must “maintain the mortgaged premises in good condition to prevent its
deterioration.” Landau v. W. Pa. Nat’l Bank, 282 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1971).
52 Fox, supra note 9, at 43 (“A Woodstock Institute Study of vacant properties in Chicago found that
homes were more likely to become vacant when a foreclosure was initiated, but not followed through to
sale.”).
53 Id. This Comment recognizes that a typical homeowner has a duty to maintain his property in
conformity with health, nuisance, and environmental laws. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (requiring potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) to conduct or pay for the cleanup of contaminated property and classifying any current “owner or
operator” of a “facility” as a PRP); Johnson, supra note 10, at 1195 & n.159 (“Under the Property
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strategically refuse to execute the deed as a way to escape any liability that
comes from owning the vacant home.54
C. Problems Caused by Zombie Mortgages
The easiest problem to identify is the financial burden zombie mortgages
create for unsuspecting borrowers. A borrower, believing he had lost the
property as a result of a lender’s foreclosure initiation, now finds that he is the
owner of record on the mortgaged property. As the owner of record, he is
legally liable for back taxes and any other fees associated with the period
during which the home was not occupied by any of the parties.55
Yet, the effects of zombie mortgages reach far beyond the financial
ramifications imposed on a borrower. Zombie mortgages create negative
socioeconomic effects on cities that house those affected properties.56
Particularly in low-income neighborhoods, neighboring homeowners are
concerned by the health hazards abandoned homes pose.57 These zombie
mortgages are “magnets for crime and drug use . . . . [a]nd they suck the life
out [of] the valuations of other homes on the street.”58
While some communities have pushed for legislation to impose fines on
lenders that do not comply with cleanup during the vacancy period,59 others
Maintenance Code of New York State, an ‘owner’ is a responsible party in a nuisance action and is described
as the person holding legal title of the property.” (citing N.Y. PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE ch. 2, § 202
(2007), which “specifies the responsibilities of owners, operators, and occupants regarding the proper
maintenance of residential and non-residential buildings”)). This Comment then infers that once the
foreclosure sale purchaser buys the property, it becomes the legal owner of the property, and legal ownership
imposes onto this new owner a duty to care for the property.
54 Kristin M. Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on their Mortgages, Lenders Playing
the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Paying the Price, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621, 633 (2010). By not recording
the deed, “lenders hide their identity until the sale of the property is near.” Id.
55 See Linda Finley, Walking Dead? Beware the Zombie Foreclosure, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Aug. 6,
2014, 3:32 PM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/blogs/lens/walking-dead-beware-the-zombieforeclosure-1042296-1.html (“The borrower, zombie-like, unknowingly continues to accrue tax and code
violation liability and technically still owes the money on the [promissory] note.”).
56 Weber, supra note 33, at 46.
57 See Barbara Livingston Nackman, ‘Zombie’ Homes Continue to Gather Weeds, LOHUD (July 11, 2014,
10:50 PM), http://www.lohud.com/story/news/2014/07/10/neighbors-complain-zombie-homes/12486409/. The
average condition of a property that has fallen victim to a zombie mortgage can include graffiti, tepid pools,
pests and insect infestations, overgrown weeds, and vagrant squatter occupations. Id.
58 Don Walker, Hundreds of Zombie Homes Plague Milwaukee Neighborhoods, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (May 25, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/hundreds-of-zombie-homes-plaguemilwaukee-neighborhoods-b99276701z1-260613161.html.
59 Nackman, supra note 57.
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have imposed criminal sanctions on homeowners.60 Nuisance abatement and
tax foreclosures have been successful at retuning properties to productive use,
but these proceedings are often too time consuming to rehabilitate a large
number of zombie mortgages.61 Similarly, sanctions imposed on lenders for
failing to comply with property oversight and maintenance requirements
include a maximum fine of $1,000 or up to six months in jail.62 Imposing those
monetary sanctions, however, does not truly injure a lender because a $1,000
fine is miniscule when compared to the potential costs of bringing the vacant
property up to health and safety code standards.63 Though a judge in
Cleveland, Ohio, has attempted to impose a $5,000 fine on a lender for each
day out of compliance, guidelines for this type of penalty still indicate that this
could only be applied against a lender already in possession of the mortgaged
property.64
A growing number of jurisdictions have fought back against zombie
mortgages by adopting Vacant Property Registration Ordinances (VPROs).
VPROs “seek to create a mechanism for identifying the potentially responsible
parties for unoccupied buildings and impose appropriate costs upon those
parties by requiring registration of [the] vacant property with the local
government.”65 Yet the uncertainty of vacant property registration periods66

60 Conlin, supra note 1 (“In some cities, people with zombie titles can be sentenced to probation—with
the threat of jail if they don’t bring their houses into compliance.”). However, some jurisdictions have shifted
the criminal focus from the borrower to the lender. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1187 (explaining that some
cities have “resorted to using criminal nuisance lawsuits to get lenders to abate nuisances at individual
properties”).
61 Johnson, supra note 10, at 1188.
62 Arthur B. Axelson, Go Directly to Jail? Las Vegas Joins Other Jurisdictions in Imposing Burden of
Upkeep of Vacant Properties on Lenders, DYKEMA (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.dykema.com/resources-alertsimposing-burden-of-upkeep.html.
63 Johnson, supra note 10, at 1195 (stating that often “civil fines associated with a single property are not
sufficient to change the behavior of national lenders,” forcing cities to come up with stronger sanctions).
64 Id. at 1197.
65 Benton C. Martin, Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 6, 9 (2010); Property
Registration, COMMUNITY CHAMPIONS, http://cchampions.com/property-registration/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2015).
66 The triggering event—when the nuisance is abated—is inherently ambiguous because there is no exact
time period or deadline to abate the nuisance. Because there is no clear guideline as to what is considered
“failure to abate,” courts struggle with ambiguity in trying to enforce vacant property registration ordinances.
See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1243–44.
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suggests that these ordinances’ cannot be “standalone solutions” to urban
blight or zombie mortgages.67
Due to the difficulty of identifying the owner of the mortgaged property,
cities often assume the cost of property maintenance, inspection, and crime
prevention.68 As a result, some communities are letting the affected residential
properties decay, refusing to spend “public funds on securing, cleaning and
stabilizing houses that generate no tax revenue.”69 To prevent the externalities
zombie mortgages create, new approaches focusing on lenders’ right to
foreclose must be considered.
II. THE RIGHTS OF A LENDER PRIOR TO FORECLOSURE
In the absence of language articulating the rights of a lender in a
single-family residential contractual agreement, U.S. courts have
predominantly looked to two different theories: title theory and lien theory.70
Rooted in English law, title theory gives legal title of the property to a
lender until the mortgage is satisfied, at which point, title would be conveyed
back to a borrower.71 With the development of borrowers’ equity of
redemption,72 modern courts have interpreted title theory to give lenders
theoretical title to the mortgaged property while borrowers remain in
possession and, for practical purposes, are considered the true owners of such
property.73 Lenders could still exercise their rights to possession but they were

67 See generally Benton C. Martin, Federalism and Municipal Innovation: Lessons from the Fight
Against Vacant Properties, 46 URB. LAW. 361, 370 (2014) (stating that although neither land banks nor
VPROs alone were perfect solutions to urban blight, both could be combined with state and federal
government tools to strengthen their effectiveness).
68 Walker, supra note 58 (noting that in the previous year, a quarter of the Department of Neighborhood
Services’s resources for abatement were used to inspect homes fallen victim to zombie mortgages).
69 Conlin, supra note 1. In at least three states, some properties have exploded because the gas had not
been shut off prior to such lender and borrower’s abandonment. Id.
70 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.1–4.5, at 135–44 (5th ed.
2007) (discussing and comparing title theory, lien theory, and intermediate theory).
71 Id. at 135 (citing Robert Kratovil, Mortgages—Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgage Liability,
11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1961)).
72 The equity of redemption doctrine states that “every mortgage borrower has the right, at any time after
default, to redeem the collateral by repaying the debt until the lender has completed a ‘foreclosure’ on the
collateral.” Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption,
52 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (1999).
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (arguing that
although significant limitations have been placed on the title theory, “in the absence of agreement to the
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often held to stricter standards.74 Title theory still exists today; a lender has a
right to immediate possession against a borrower, often after such borrower
has defaulted.75
Under lien theory, followed by the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, a lender
acquires only a lien on the mortgaged real estate and the borrower retains both
legal and equitable title and the right to possession until foreclosure.76 Because
a borrower is considered the legal owner of the mortgaged property, the lender
has no right to possession of the property unless it becomes the legal owner by
bidding on the property at the foreclosure sale, or the borrower abandons it.77
Today, courts give primary consideration to the language in the mortgage,
or security deed, to determine the rights of a lender.78 Although almost every
jurisdiction’s standard form mortgage contains non-uniform clauses—which
give a lender the right to accelerate payment of the debt, to prevent waste by a
borrower, and to come into possession of the property after a borrower’s
abandonment—it often does not contain language delineating the lender’s right
to possess the property.79 Hence, with the exception of those lenders’ rights
explicitly established in the mortgage instrument, the underlying lien and title
theories have guided the judiciary’s decisions in the absence of contractual
language indicating the rights of a lender in residential property transactions.
A. Rights When a Borrower Is Still in Possession of the Mortgaged Property
Typically, lenders have various rights with respect to their security interest
on the mortgaged property. These rights stem from both title and lien theories,
as well as from contractual provisions in the mortgage document.80 Some of
contrary, the mortgagee has a right to immediate possession against the mortgagor”). This assertion can be
important where the borrower seeks to divert rent profits to service the underlying loan obligation. Id.
74 See Maglione v. BancBoston Mortg. Corp., 557 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the
borrower, for practical and theoretical purposes, is to be regarded as the owner of the land).
75 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 26 (West 2014).
76 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.2, at 139; see Martinez v. Continental Enters., 730 P.2d 308,
312, 314 (Colo. 1986) (en banc).
77 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.2, at 139–41.
78 See generally Fannie Mae–Freddie Mac Deed of Trust §§ 18–19, https://www.fanniemae.com/content/
legal_form/3048w.doc. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac forms contain substantial limitations and provisions that
may vary from state to state.
79 See Security Instruments, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/security-instruments
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
80 See supra note 79; cf. Beckford v. Empire Mut. Ins. Grp., 525 N.Y.S.2d 260, 263 (App. Div. 1988)
(discussing the lender’s right to insure the mortgaged property but refusing to turn that right into an affirmative
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the rights enjoyed by lenders include the right to prevent waste on the
mortgaged property, the right to pay for property insurance or taxes to protect
its security interest, the right to accelerate the collection of the mortgages debt,
and, most importantly, the right to foreclose on the property.81 Additionally,
when a borrower is still in possession of the mortgaged property, the rights of a
lender take into consideration the physical occupancy and possession of the
borrower.82
First, if a borrower intentionally causes physical damage to the mortgaged
property he or she has created waste.83 Borrowers may use the property in its
usual and proper manner and may incur some damage to the property resulting
from normal use and exposure, as long as it does not result in significant
diminution of the value of the property.84 Over time, courts have increasingly
expanded the concept of waste to encompass situations wherein waste occurs
as a result of a borrower’s actions, either negligent or intentional, which reduce
the value of the mortgaged property or the security interest of the lender.85
Second, a lender has a right to obtain any insurance necessary to protect its
security interest and to add the cost of procuring this coverage to the balance
owed on the loan.86 Courts have traditionally interpreted this right as an option,
obligation); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that lien theory lenders are permitted to recover for passive waste in addition to voluntary
waste); Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Crazy After All These Years: The Absolute Assignment of Rents in a
Mortgage Loan Transaction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 487, 492–93 (2007) (noting that while a foreclosing lender may
have a legal right to rent proceeds during foreclosure, as a practical matter, this income is typically still
realized by the borrower in default); David A. Leipziger, The Mortgagee’s Remedies for Waste, 64 CALIF. L.
REV 1086 (1976) (discussing both contractual and common law remedies for lenders).
81 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
82 Forrester, supra note 80, at 493.
83 Leipziger, supra note 80; see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 404 N.W.2d at 113.
84 See Kruger v. Horton, 725 P.2d 417 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
85 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.6(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (including negligent
physical changes to the property which reduce its value, failure to maintain and repair the property in a
reasonable manner, failure to pay taxes or governmental assessments, failure to maintain insurance on the
property, failure to comply with the covenants of the mortgage as to the physical care and maintenance of the
property, or retention of rents to which the lender is entitled).
86 Beckford v. Empire Mut. Ins. Grp., 525 N.Y.S.2d 260, 263 (App. Div. 1988); Security Instruments,
FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/security-instruments (last visited Jan. 24, 2016)
(listing security instruments, including the Single Family Uniform Instrument Form for Michigan, which
includes the following provision: “If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender
may obtain insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and Borrower’s expense. Lender is under no obligation to
purchase any particular type or amount of coverage.”). Though both parties have an interest in the property,
there is usually only one policy taken out—often by the borrower for the benefit of the lender. See Tech Land
Dev., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Co., 291 S.E.2d 821, 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
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and not an obligation, to obtain insurance.87 Any liability must arise from a
positive duty imposed on a lender, ensuing from either a contractual
relationship between the former and the borrower, or “because of the negligent
manner in which some act which the contract provides for is done.”88 Similar
to the lender’s right to step in to obtain property insurance, most loan
documents indicate that failure by a borrower to pay property taxes will trigger
a lender’s right to accelerate repayment of the debt.89
Third, a lender has a right to foreclose on a mortgaged property. This is one
of the lender’s most significant rights. A lender can either enter and take
possession the property, or sell the mortgaged property at an auction and apply
the proceeds of the sale to reduce the outstanding loan balance. If a lender
exercises its right to take possession of the property prior to a foreclosure sale,
it becomes the “mortgagee in possession.”90 In the past, this right has not been
interpreted to impose an obligation on the lender to take possession of the
mortgaged property.91
The right to possession and the respective mortgagee-in-possession status
can often deter lenders from taking possession because it exposes those lenders
to obligations and potential liabilities.92 Any act of destruction against the
property, including mismanagement, will be considered waste, which in turn
imposes strict accountability upon the lender.93 In fact, a lender in possession
is “bound to use reasonable means to preserve the [mortgaged property] from
loss or injury” and prevent any deterioration arising its failure to act after it
comes into possession.94

87

Beckford, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
Id.
89 In most security instruments, the borrower is creating a covenant by promising that he will provide for
taxes and assessments into an escrow account. A breach of this covenant is grounds for acceleration. See, e.g.,
Security Instruments, supra note 86. Sections 4 and 22 of Alabama’s Single Family Uniform Instrument, for
example, include such a covenant.
90 See, e.g., Valley Int’l Props., Inc. v. Brownsville Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 581 S.W.2d. 222, 223–25 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979).
91 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.24, at 200.
92 See Woodview Condo Ass’n v. Shanahan, 917 A.2d 790, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
93 See id. at 792–94; Smith v. Stringer, 155 So. 85, 86 (Ala. 1934); American Freehold Land Mortg. Co.
of London v. Pollard, 82 So. 630, 630–31 (Ala. 1902) (holding for strict accountability for timber removed).
The measure of damages will be the diminution in the value of the estate caused by the destruction. Id.
94 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.29, at 212; see United Nat’l Bank v. Parish, 750 A.2d 238,
241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (“[T]he duty of the mortgagee in possession is that of a provident owner.”
(citation omitted)); Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); Matthew H. Ahrens & David S.
88
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Certainly, imposing on lenders the obligations that come alongside the
mortgagee-in-possession title is theoretically simple, as long as the lender has
exercised ownership or possession of the mortgaged property.95 A lender is
considered to be in possession of a residential property when it “exercise[s]
dominion and control over the [mortgaged] property.”96 Similarly, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) suggests that possession includes “exercise of control and active
participation in management.”97 Though an argument could be made that a
foreclosure filing could be considered an exercise of control over the
mortgaged property98—making a foreclosing lender a mortgagee in possession
and consequently liable for the mortgaged property—this Comment focuses on
judicial and legislative termination of lenders’ rights to foreclose.
Alternatively, if a lender is not in possession of the mortgaged property, it
may evoke its right to petition for a judicially appointed receiver.99 As an
impartial third party, a receiver is judicially appointed at the request of a lender
to take possession of the mortgaged property to repair it, preserve it, and
collect any rents it produces.100 A receiver’s position as an officer of the court
enables him to take possession of the property—owing a fiduciary duty to both
the lender and the borrower—but also shields him from legal liability.101 By
Langer, Lender Liability Under CERCLA, Environmental Risks for Lenders Under the Superfund: A Refresher
for the Economic Downturn, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 482, 486 (2008).
95 See Coleman, 64 P.3d at 68 (explaining that a lender “who properly acquire[d] ‘mortgagee in
possession status’ is held accountable for that possession . . . to third parties” (alteration in original) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1, at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1997))).
96 Id. (describing different circumstances under which a lender can be considered to have indicia of
control, including but not limited to leasing, making repairs, and making management decisions); see Bank of
Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Bank of Amador Cty., 28 P.2d 86, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
97 Under CERCLA, a lender has an obligation to maintain and clean up the property if it “participates in
management” of the property, such as when it “(1) undertakes decision-making control or responsibility for the
facility’s hazardous substance handling or disposal practices; or (2) exercises control at the level of a manager
over . . . day-to-day decision-making or . . . operational functions.” Ahrens & Langer, supra note 94, at
485–86. Though CERCLA establishes safe harbor provisions that protect a lender from liability of the polluted
property, a lender can only take advantage of such provisions if it has refrained from coming into possession of
the property or has not engaged in management of such property. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (2012).
98 An argument has previously been made that by “sending letters threatening eviction or foreclosure
against defaulting homeowners, the lenders have asserted control over the property, triggering a responsibility
to maintain the home.” Johnson, supra note 10, at 1195. It is unclear whether this argument has prevailed.
99 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 564(b) (West 2015); GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-3 (West 2011); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2735.01 (West 2006).
100 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.33, at 217.
101 See, e.g., Four Strong Winds, Inc. v. Lyngholm, 826 P.2d 414 (Colo. App. 1992); Zeligman v.
Juergens, 762 P.2d 783 (Colo. App. 1988).
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requesting a receiver, a lender avoids taking possession of the property and
consequently escapes any liability to own it, maintain it, and repair it while it is
vacant.102
B. Lenders’ Rights When the Mortgaged Property Is Unoccupied
The lender’s rights once a mortgaged property is legally unoccupied are
similar to the rights it holds when a borrower is in possession. The lender’s
rights to accelerate the debt, foreclose on the mortgaged property, prevent
waste, and collect rents remain.103 A lender also has a right to enter and
possess the property, not just in a title theory jurisdiction but also under lien
theory.104
But possession does not necessarily mean occupation; a lender can be
considered a mortgagee in possession if it exercises dominion and control over
the mortgaged property.105 A lender is often deterred from taking possessory
action for fear that it will incur an affirmative duty to maintain the property.106
Though it is true that the borrower remains contractually and legally liable for
the mortgaged property, possession by the lender could translate into its own
liability to third parties.107
C. When Lenders’ Rights Turn into Obligations
A lender’s right to foreclose includes an obligation to inform the borrower
of the foreclosure proceeding at the outset.108 While the majority of judicial
foreclosure states impose notice requirements on the lender at the beginning of
the foreclosure proceeding, there is no notice requirement if the lender later
elects to reschedule the sale.109 The Federal Reserve has previously
102 See Patrick A. Randolph Jr., The Mortgagee’s Interest in Rent: Some Policy Considerations and
Proposals, 29 KAN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1980).
103 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 70, § 4.24, at 200–01. The rationale behind this right to possession
stems from the public’s interest in protecting the property from decay, natural or man-made.
105 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
106 See Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (“A mortgagee who properly acquires
mortgagee in possession status is held accountable for that possession . . . to third parties.” (ellipses in original)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1, at 189 (AM. LAW INST. 1997))).
107 Essex Cleaning Contractors Inc., v. Amato, 317 A.2d 411, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
108 Cox, supra note 31, at 700 & n.110; Weber, supra note 33, at 41–42.
109 See Weber, supra note 33, at 42 & n.28; LEXISNEXIS, 50 STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES &
REGULATIONS: JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (Jan. 2015).
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emphasized the importance of informing the borrower of the postponed, or
cancelled, foreclosure sale to prevent additional zombie mortgages.110
In both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions, there is no
question that property maintenance liability will arise if a lender gains
ownership of the property by placing the highest bid at its own foreclosure
sale, and then promptly executes and records the deed of sale.111 Such a clear
scenario sits in stark contrast to the lender-created circumstances under which
zombie mortgages surface.112 The next Part will demonstrate that, in those
instances, a lender’s right to foreclose should turn into an obligation to
complete the foreclosure sale.
III. FORECLOSING ON LENDERS’ RIGHTS
As mentioned in Part II of this Comment, most lenders are cautious not to
be considered a mortgagee in possession so as not to incur any affirmative
obligations to maintain mortgaged property or to foreclose.113 Nonetheless, the
externalities arising from lenders’ calculated decisions—decisions to abandon
a foreclosure sale halfway through its execution—are far too severe to
ignore.114 This Comment calls for increased judicial and legislative action to
foreclose on the rights of a “sleeping” lender.115
The banking industry has insisted—successfully thus far—that they cannot
be held liable for the maintenance of a property that they do not own.116 They
argue that they should not be forced to foreclose and effectively become the
110

Letter from Michael S. Gibson & Sandra F. Braustein, Dirs., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank (July 11, 2012), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1211.pdf (listing the subject as “Guidance on a Lender’s Decision to
Discontinue Foreclosure Proceedings” and recommending that a lender should notify a borrower when
decision to not pursue foreclosure action is made, their rights to occupy the property until the sale is
completed, the financial obligations outstanding, and outlining maintenance responsibilities).
111 See infra Part IV.
112 See supra Part I.B.
113 In the case of foreclosure, the lender is particularly worried about being the highest bidder at its own
foreclosure auction, which would make the lender the legal owner of the property, subject to ownership duties
and liabilities. This often happens when the amount of the outstanding debt is greater than the fair market
value of the property.
114 See Conlin, supra note 1 (describing the effects of zombie mortgages on their respective
neighborhoods and cities).
115 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3527 (West 2012).
116 Conlin, supra note 1 (“Banks say that because they are not the legal owners of these homes, they aren’t
required to maintain them, pay taxes on them, or take any legal responsibility for them.”).
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owner of the property.117 In some respects, the lenders’ comments are correct:
a lender, in theory, has the right to foreclose on the mortgaged property, sue on
the promissory note, or undertake both options simultaneously as a way to
recuperate the outstanding balance of the loan.118 And while the lender cannot
be forced to pursue one option over the other at the outset,119 this protection
may evaporate when the lender voluntarily chooses to pursue a foreclosure
action.
In exploring solutions to the zombie mortgage crisis, this Comment
highlights the necessity of creating frameworks for both judicial and
nonjudicial jurisdictions since both types of jurisdictions have created
conditions in which zombie mortgages can thrive. This Part first analyzes
previous judicial action that can potentially provide an answer to the zombie
mortgage crisis and then explores the current legislative pitfalls that exacerbate
zombie mortgages.
A. Affirmative Judicial Action in Judicial Foreclosure Jurisdictions
In a primarily judicial foreclosure jurisdiction, a foreclosure sale usually
occurs anytime between 360 to 990 days from the date the action was
commenced.120 Most jurisdictions do not actually set maximum statutory
periods within which a lender must conduct the foreclosure sale or finalize the
sale after the auction takes place.121 These factors foster an environment in
which zombie mortgages thrive.
To combat zombie mortgages arising from ambiguous foreclosure time
lines, affirmative judicial action must center around using equitable discretion,
sua sponte or otherwise, to require that a lender complete foreclosure
117 See generally In re Perry, No. 12-01633-8-RDD, 2012 WL 4795675 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012)
(holding that a creditor cannot be forced to into accepting surrendered collateral or be required to foreclose).
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (1997) (“Once the mortgage goes into
default and the obligation is accelerated, this section gives the [lender] the choice to proceed initially on the
underlying personal obligation or to foreclose on the mortgaged real estate. . . . This section does not require,
as do a few states, that the [lender] exhaust the mortgaged real estate prior to proceeding on the personal
obligation.”).
119 See id.
120 Foreclosure Time Frames and Compensatory Fee Allowable Delays Exhibit, FANNIE MAE (2014),
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide_exhibit/foreclosure-timeframes-compensatory-fees-allowabledelays.pdf. Fannie Mae classified South Dakota as having the quickest foreclosure time frame, at 360 days,
while New York City delays extended to an average of 990 days. Id.
121 See LEXISNEXIS, 50 STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS: JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (Jan.
2015).
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proceedings within a specific time frame from the date of the order authorizing
the sale, or alternatively risk losing its security interest. This section explains
the doctrine of equitable discretion—a concept that this Comment later applies
to require a lender to conduct a foreclosure sale.
1. Past Use of Equitable Discretion to Prevent Foreclosure Delays
A zombie mortgage analysis requires recognizing the distinction between
statutes of limitation and the doctrine of laches. A statute of limitations in the
residential mortgage context establishes the time period within which the
lender must commence a cause of action, if any.122 A statute of limitations is no
longer relevant once a zombie mortgage exists because the lender has already
filed an action with the court and obtained a judgment authorizing a
foreclosure sale.123 Thus, once a lender has judicial authorization to proceed
with a foreclosure action, the analysis shifts from limiting a lender’s time to
file a cause of action, to creating a time frame for a lender to conduct the
foreclosure sale. To successfully achieve the latter, it is imperative for state
courts to emphasize the equitable principle that “[t]he law helps the vigilant,
before those who sleep on their rights.”124
A court’s equitable discretion draws force from the doctrine of laches,
which provides that a party’s right will not be enforced or allowed if that
party’s extensive delay in asserting its right or claim has prejudiced another
party.125 The doctrine is not solely concerned with the act of delay but also
with the reason for the delay and the delay’s effect on a borrower.126 The delay

122 See ALA. CODE § 6-2-33 (2014) (cause of action relating to a contract, real estate, or a foreclosure must
be commenced within ten years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 7902 (West 2006) (statute of limitations for a cause
of action is twenty years).
123 See, e.g., supra note 122. A statute of limitations analysis would only be appropriate if a lender has not
commenced the foreclosure proceeding. See id. While lender-friendly statutory frameworks bestow on a lender
a vast amount of time to even file a foreclosure action—often allowing a lender’s statute of limitations to
trigger at the end of the amortization schedule—this Comment will not address this aspect of legislative
shortcomings.
124 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3527 (West 2012).
125 Deirdre R. Wheatley-Liss, Doctrine of Laches Means You Are “Out of Time,” LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM: EST. & ELDER L., http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elder-blog/
archive/2012/01/26/doctrine-of-laches-means-you-are-quot-out-of-time-quot.aspx.
126 Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 2 (2014), https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/89/2014/01/Bray-Essay.pdf.
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must be unreasonable or cause prejudice.127 And though a lender has the right
to foreclose on the mortgaged property, the doctrine of laches explains that a
“mortgage foreclosure, being equitable in nature, may be denied, even within
such period, if it appears that an unreasonable delay has misled the
[borrower].”128
State and federal courts alike have often refused to allow the doctrine of
laches to shorten lenders’ statute of limitations period to file a foreclosure
action.129 Nevertheless, courts have not necessarily extended this treatment to
lenders who have already filed and commenced a foreclosure action.130 It
follows that under some circumstances courts could utilize their equitable
discretion, entrenched in the doctrine of laches, to require a lender to complete
the exercise of its right to foreclose, especially after such lender has already
started to exercise that right but has recklessly wasted judicial resources by
delaying the sale.131
Judicial use of equitable discretion is not a new premise. In Boorstein v.
Miller, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey prevented undue harm to the
mortgage assignor by enjoining a mortgage assignee from seeking indemnity
from the assignor on a foreclosure deficiency action when such assignee failed
to exercise reasonable diligence in completing a foreclosure proceeding.132 In a
manner true to the doctrine of equitable judicial discretion, this court stated
that the assigned lender, “after the [borrower’s] defaults, [was] obligated to use

127 Id. (“It is this focus on considerations other than the mere passage of time that strongly distinguishes
laches from statutes of limitations.”).
128 Verna v. O’Brien, 356 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932–33 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
129 See Kaminski v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Auditors, 287 Mich. 62 (1938); BRUCE J. BERGMAN, 1–5
BERGMAN ON NEW YORK MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES § 5.10 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2015) (1990) (“[A]
delay of one year after default in instituting foreclosure cannot defeat the action where opposition is founded
upon a claim of laches.”).
130 See BERGMAN, supra note 129, § 5.10.
131 See id. (stating that while laches cannot by used by the borrower as a typical defense to a foreclosure
action against him, it can be asserted where the exercise of the mortgagee’s right “would be inequitable after
the passage of a lengthy time period”).
132 3 A.2d 87, 91 (N.J. Ch. 1938) (holding that a mortgage assignee was not eligible for indemnification
from the assignor when such assignee had voluntarily subordinated the second mortgage to a new first
mortgage and delayed the process of obtaining the funds it was owed). Though an injunction has been referred
to as the “quintessential equitable remedy,” it is but one form of judicial equitable discretion. See David W.
Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539, 539 (1986).
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diligence and reasonable care to realize on the security of their mortgage.”133
The court understood that allowing the assignee-lender to recover its security
interest “would be to impose an unwarranted penalty upon a helpless and
innocent complainant; it would be tantamount to putting ‘in reverse’ an old
equitable maxim to read ‘Equity helps not the vigilant but him who sleeps.’”134
Parallel to the use of equitable discretion in Boorstein, several courts have
used their discretionary power to prevent lenders from acting contrary to the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.135 Under this premise, a lender “cannot act
with complete impunity toward assets which he has under his control, and
which [are] available to reduce [a borrower’s] liability.”136
These examples support the proposition that though the doctrine of laches
has not been often used to shorten a lender’s period to file a foreclosure
action,137 it could, and should, be used to prevent unfair and inequitable actions
of a lender.138
2. Using Equitable Discretion to Force the Completion of the Sale
Though it has been a gradual transition, courts have become increasingly
supportive of affirmative judicial action to conduct foreclosure sales.139 The
proposition that local judiciaries hold a certain amount of power to order a
foreclosure sale—after a lender intentionally ceases all actions to complete the
sale—has been supported by various bankruptcy courts.140

133 Boorstein, 3 A.2d at 90. Additionally, the court also held that, notwithstanding the mortgagee’s “fair
dealing” obligations to use diligence and reasonable care to realize its security interest, it could not collect on a
deficiency in the security without conducting a foreclosure (an action which the mortgagee had not taken). Id.
134 Id. (quoting McMurray v. Noyes, 72 N.Y. 523 (1878)). But cf. Anabarasan v. 53–54 Palisades Hudson
Assocs., LLC, No. L-63-09, 2012 WL 1108418, at *4 & n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2012)
(distinguishing the case where defendants could not show the sort of prejudice suffered by the Guarantor in
Boorstein from the lender’s failure to provide notice).
135 See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 198 N.W.2d 543, 549–51 (Minn. 1972).
136 Id. at 550.
137 See Kaminski v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Auditors, 282 N.W. 902 (Mich. 1938); BERGMAN, supra note 129
(“[A] delay of one year after default in instituting foreclosure cannot defeat the action where opposition is
founded upon a claim of laches.”).
138 See Boorstein, 3 A.2d at 90.
139 See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
2011).
140 Weber, supra note 33, at 59–61.
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Indeed, bankruptcy courts have focused on the lender’s inaction and the
intent behind it. In Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), a
bankruptcy court in Tennessee used its equitable powers and held that it had
the authority to order the sale free and clear of liens when it finds the lender
and homeowners association (HOA) to have consented to the sale through
inaction.141 Though the borrower originally sought to make the HOA fees that
accrued during her vacancy of the property dischargeable under a bankruptcy
statute, she then sought to compel the lender to instigate foreclosure
proceedings to stop the HOA fees from accruing while the lender took no
action.142
Similarly, other courts have looked to the lender’s intent behind its delay of
the sale to craft their opinions. In In re Perry, the bankruptcy court in the
Eastern District of North Carolina entered an order that required a lender to
foreclose or be forced to accept a quitclaim deed.143 Citing delays in
foreclosure, the court used its discretionary power to hold that if the lender did
not act timely to foreclose on the property, then the borrower was authorized to
“execute, deliver and record a quitclaim deed of the property to [the
lender].”144 The In re Perry court used its discretionary power to force the
lender to either sell the property or be forced to become the new owner.145
The bankruptcy courts’ holdings in both In re Pigg146 and In re Perry147
demonstrate the concept of judicial intervention to force a lender to foreclose
when inaction by the same imposes an unjust result on a borrower and takes
unfair advantage of the foreclosure right it was given. Though there has been
opposition to the broad use of judicial powers to force a lender to exercise its
foreclosure rights,148 such judicial equitable powers could be narrowed and
applied only to situations in which a lender has started a foreclosure action and
has voluntarily come under the jurisdiction of a court.
141

453 B.R. at 736.
Id. at 730.
143 No. 12-01633-8-RDD, 2012 WL 4795675, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012).
144 Id.
145 See id.
146 In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 736.
147 2012 WL 4795675, at *2.
148 See generally In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012)
(holding that the court lacked equitable power to approve a sale free of liens without the lender’s consent); In
re Arsenault, 456 B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s ability to utilize
equitable remedies “is constrained by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and that the Code does not
permit the courts to create substantive rights).
142

CLARK GALLEYSPROOFS3

818

2/29/2016 1:42 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:795

Hence, despite having roots in bankruptcy law, the idea of judicial
equitable power to force a foreclosure sale can easily branch into the concept
of zombie mortgages by carefully tailoring the holdings of In re Pigg and In re
Perry into a narrower, yet more just and efficient, concept. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin recently held in Bank of New York Mellon v. Carson that a
Wisconsin statute149 gave the circuit court the power to order a lender to sell
the residential property upon the expiration of the redemption period.150 In
Carson, a lender filed a foreclosure action against Carson, the borrower.151
Carson vacated the property after the lender commenced the foreclosure action
and soon after the lender received a judgment from the court in its favor.152 Not
only did the bank not inspect or maintain the property through the redemption
period, but it also failed to schedule a sheriff’s sale.153 During this time, Carson
remained the legal owner of the property despite the fact that she no longer
occupied the property and had to pay fines to the city relating to unaddressed
building code violations and health hazards.154 More than sixteen months after
the entry of the judgment for foreclosure in favor of the lender, Carson filed an
action to order the sale of the property.155
The trial court concluded that it did not have the authority to hold the
sale.156 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s holding and
stated that the Wisconsin statute at hand “directs the court to ensure that an
abandoned property is sold without delay, and it logically follows that if a
party to a foreclosure moves the court to order a sale, the court may use its
contempt authority to do so.”157 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed,
focusing on the intent of the Wisconsin statute at hand.158 In arriving at its
decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concentrated on two issues: whether
149 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102 (West Supp. 2015). At the time of publication of this Comment, a new
assembly bill had been introduced in the Wisconsin House of Representatives. H.R. 720, 102d Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015). The proposed bill would amend the statute at issue in Carson by permitting a court to
declare a mortgaged property abandoned, and then to order the lender to sell the property and have the sale
confirmed within 12 months after the judgment is entered, or release the mortgage lien and vacate the
foreclosure judgment. Id. § 7.
150 859 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Wis. 2015).
151 Id. at 424.
152 Id. at 424–25.
153 Id. at 425.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Bank of N.Y. v. Carson, 841 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
157 Id. at 578.
158 Carson, 859 N.W.2d. at 426–27 (interpreting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102 (West Supp. 2012)).
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a Wisconsin statute authorized the circuit court to order a lender to sell the
property at an auction, and whether a court can require a lender to sell the
property at a specific point in time.159
Using the plain language rule of statutory construction, the trial court
interpreted the legislature’s use of the word “shall” in the Wisconsin statute at
issue as entrusting power to the court to order a lender to sell the mortgaged
property after the expiration of the redemption period.160 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin acknowledged this interpretation, but recognized that it has
previously stated that “‘shall’ will be construed as directory if necessary to
carry out the intent of the legislature.”161
The Carson court understood that any ruling to the contrary would permit
the lender to leave the property in legal limbo indefinitely and would strip the
borrower from any remedies at law.162 It also rejected the lender’s argument
that vague statutory language stating the minimum wait time to conduct the
sale should be interpreted as permitting the lender to foreclose at any time after
the minimum redemption period.163 A pure exercise of its equitable
discretion,164 the Carson court’s refusal to interpret vague statutory language to
the lender’s benefit could easily be extrapolated and applied to other
ambiguous state statutes165 to hold that a lender does not have an unlimited
period of time to complete the foreclosure sale, as this would be unreasonable.
Further, the Carson court knew that, in the absence of a clear maximum
time frame for the completion of the foreclosure sale, it would have to step in
to fashion a fair decision based on the intent of the legislature—not just be
159

Id. at 426.
Id. The court stated that the plain language of the statute grants the circuit court the authority to order a
bank to sell the property and that if the court makes a finding of abandonment then “judgment shall be entered
as provided in § 846.10 except that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5
weeks from the date when such judgment is entered.” Id. at 426–27; GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Gisvold, 572
N.W.2d 466, 475 (Wis. 1998) (“The general rule in interpreting statutory language is that ‘the word “shall” is
presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute.’” (quoting Karow v. Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
263 N.W.2d 214 (1978))).
161 Carson, 859 N.W.2d. at 428 (citing State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707 (1991)).
162 Id. at 431; Carson, 841 N.W.2d at 578.
163 Carson, 859 N.W.2d. at 430.
164 Bray, supra note 126, at 2; see Wheatley-Liss, supra note 125.
165 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:14 (2013). New Hampshire’s statute is ambiguous; the trigger,
forcing the deed to be recorded, is subject to a written request for recordation from a person having an interest
in the mortgaged real estate. See id. If a third party does not provide such a request in writing, a lender is not
subject to the statute. Id.
160

CLARK GALLEYSPROOFS3

820

2/29/2016 1:42 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:795

swayed by the technicalities of the law that contradict the intent of the
statute.166 By looking at the Wisconsin statute that established the reasoning
behind the five-week redemption period, the court discerned that the ordinance
was designed to “help municipalities deal with abandoned properties in a
timely manner” and prevent further neighborhood blight.167 This reasoning
helped the court conclude that the Bank of New York’s actions violated the
intent of the statute and warranted judicial intervention.
3. Judicial Appointment of Receivers as a Channel to Force the Completion
of the Foreclosure Sale
At the core of the zombie mortgage problem is the fact that a lender has no
affirmative obligation to maintain or take possession of the property.168
Though a lender has a pre-foreclosure right to come into the property, take
possession of it, and maintain it to protect the value of its security interest, it
does not currently have a formal obligation to maintain or repair the property
before it becomes the owner of the same or takes possession of it.169
Accordingly, many scholars have raised concerns about common law and
property rights violations from imposing property ownership obligations on a
lender that does not legally own the property.170 Such imposition of duties
could be a violation to the mortgagee-in-possession principle.171 However,
even if the direct imposition of ownership and maintenance obligations on a
lender is problematic, courts can utilize their equitable discretion to intervene
and allow third parties—affected by the blighted residential properties—to
move for a judicial appointment of a receiver. By passing authority onto a
receiver to repair the property and later conduct the foreclosure sale, the
judiciary might be able to “force” the completion of the sale nonetheless.

166 Carson, 859 N.W.2d at 430–31 (“Four individuals spoke at the public hearing on the bill . . . . Each
individual referenced that the bill’s intent was to help municipalities deal with abandoned properties in a
timely manner.”)
167 Id. at 431–32; see MILWAUKEE, WIS. MUN. CODE § 200-22.5 (2015).
168 Johnson, supra note 10, at 1186–87 (describing the dubious ownership status of the property as a result
of lenders’ ownership avoidance strategies).
169 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 44, at 29.
170 Axelson, supra note 62.
171 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 44, at 59 (“[S]ome advocates . . . have suggested that
the costs of maintaining properties should be formally imposed on servicers, although the feasibility of such an
approach is unknown, and it may have unintended consequences if implemented.”).
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A successful receivership primarily depends on two factors: (1) permitting
individuals or entities other than a lender to petition the court for a receiver;
and (2) making a receiver’s costs of the property’s repair and maintenance a
super-priority lien—a lien which would have priority over any other
mortgages, liens, and judgments already placed on the mortgaged property. At
a foreclosure sale, assuming that notice was given to both the borrower and the
lender,172 a bid equal to the amount of a receiver’s lien would eliminate the
now-junior lender and convey free and clear title to the foreclosure sale
purchaser.173
Third-party standing to petition for receiverships allows communities to
prevent abandoned properties from becoming public hazards, despite the
lender’s neglect. In some cities, “second-generation . . . receivership statutes
vest[] direct authority in tenants and community groups to initiate
receivership[s].”174 In vacant building receiverships, community residents are
the actual petitioners requesting judicial relief.175 The goal of these statutes is
to enable third parties to correct health and safety code violations on properties
they inhabit or live near—though it can also be argued that allowing third
parties to accelerate the repair of the property through a receiver opens the
door to accelerating the foreclosure sale process.176 Ohio, for example, has
created statutory authorization for third-party receivership requests; if the
mortgaged property can be classified as a public nuisance, then “the municipal
corporation, township, neighbor, tenant, or nonprofit corporation may apply in
its complaint for an injunction, receiver appointment, or other form of
relief.”177 Before a sale can take place, the receiver must certify that the
nuisance has been abated.178

172 If notice has not been given to both parties, then the foreclosure sale may be subject to omitted junior
lienor or omitted borrower consequences and procedure. See Monarch Condo. v. Raskin, 831 N.Y.S.2d 369
(App. Div 2007); U.S. Bank v. Hursey, 806 P.2d 245, 247 (Wash. 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES § 7.1 cmt. b (1997) (“Where the holder of a junior interest is not made a party . . . that interest is
neither terminated nor otherwise prejudiced by the foreclosure.”).
173 For the impact of a non-clear title upon the receiver’s sale, see Matthew J. Samsa, Note, Reclaiming
Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Development,
56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2008).
174 James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool for
Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 210, 216 (2004).
175 Id. at 227.
176 See N.Y. REAL. PROP. ACTS. LAW § 770 (McKinney Supp. 2015).
177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (West 2006).
178 Id. §
3767.41(I)(1).
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Though third-party standing to petition for receiverships is important for
zombie mortgage eradication, lenders may stop such appointment under
special circumstances. For example, Baltimore’s receivership ordinance
enables a lender to oppose the appointment of a receiver by demonstrating its
own ability to rehabilitate the property without further delay.179 On the other
hand, Baltimore’s ordinance also gives super-priority status to a receiver’s lien
for property rehabilitation expenses.180 This super-priority status would mean
that if the costs of maintenance and repair were reasonable and below the
amount of the outstanding debt, more people would be encouraged to bid on
the property for just the amount of a receiver’s lien and take the property
unencumbered by a lender’s interest.181 Las Vegas has similarly imposed city
liens on abandoned property, “preventing a sale of the property until they are
paid.”182 The city would appoint a receiver to fix and maintain the property and
later add those costs to the lien on the mortgaged property.183
The receivership solution might be ideal except for a lender’s ability to
delay the sale—preventing the receiver’s lien from being paid and the property
from being sold—which can in turn continue to create zombie mortgages. To
alleviate some of these concerns, several states have enacted statutes that
relinquish a lender’s interest if it does not start foreclosure proceedings within
a specified time period after the end of a receiver’s rehabilitation.184 Statutes
like that in Missouri have allowed courts to transfer the property deed when a
lender does not take any action for two years after the appointment of the
receiver.185 In a more drastic fashion, Baltimore’s ordinance permits a receiver
to foreclose on its lien “before rehabilitation work has even begun and auction
the property off to a developer who has demonstrated the ability to rehabilitate
the property immediately.”186

179

Kelly, supra note 174, at 217.
Id.
181 Id. at 223.
182 Axelson, supra note 62.
183 Id.
184 MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.641 (West 2000).
185 Id. (stating that if any other party with an interest in the property does not take action to regain
possession of the property within two years of the appointment of the receiver, then the court may transfer title
to the property to the receiver or to a non-profit organization); Kelly, supra note 174, at 217 n.32.
186 Id. at 217.
180
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B. Legislative Action in Judicial Foreclosure Jurisdictions in the Face of a
Lender’s Inaction
A lender has the right to foreclose on the property and recuperate the
outstanding balance of the debt.187 However, the absence of maximum time
frames for conducting foreclosure sales—from the date of judicial
authorization of the sale—gives a lender, in essence, an undefined and
unlimited period to do so.188
Only a few states have used statutory guidelines to regulate the sale once
authorized by the court.189 Of those few state statutes, most have been stripped
of their effectiveness through the enactment of statutory loopholes that enable
lenders to continue exercising control over the foreclosure sale timeline. For
example, a Florida statute governing the judicial sales procedure mandates that
a mortgaged property must be scheduled and sold within a maximum of
thirty-five days from the date of final judgment.190 Yet, the statute also permits
the sale to exceed the thirty-five-day time frame should a lender consent to
it.191 This statutory loophole defeats the purpose of establishing a maximum
time frame because it is subject to the lender’s one-sided consent. Similarly,
New Jersey’s statute creates a statutory limitation for a foreclosing lender to
187 The lender has a right to bring a cause of action for foreclosure of the mortgaged property as long as it
is filed within the statute of limitations period. Currently, the majority of states’ statutes of limitations give a
lender a wide range of time within which to file its foreclosure action. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-33 (2014)
(requiring a cause of action relating to a contract, real estate, or a foreclosure to be commenced within ten
years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7902 (West 2006) (prescribing the statute of limitations for a cause of action
is twenty years). Lengthy statutes of limitations in relation to foreclosure actions are problematic when the
borrower has vacated the property in anticipation of foreclosure. Because this Comment is concerned with
zombie mortgages created once a lender files a foreclosure action but fails to complete such action, statutes of
limitation are outside the scope of this discussion.
188 Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 859 N.W.2d 422, 430 (Wis. 2015).
189 See LEXISNEXIS, 50 STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS: JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (Jan.
2015). States like Illinois, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Puerto Rico only specify that the sale
cannot occur sooner than a certain time period after giving notice of foreclosure. Id. To decrease delays in
conducting foreclosure sales after a residential property becomes unoccupied, some states have passed laws to
attempt to “fast-track” vacant property foreclosures. Though currently insufficient to prevent zombie
mortgages, the fast-track proceeding would, in theory, increase the efficiency of foreclosures by shortening the
amount of time properties are vacant and “eliminating the deadweight losses lenders suffer.” Kyle Fee &
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Economic Commentary: Estimating the Impact of Fast-Tracking Foreclosures in
Ohio and Pennsylvania, FED. RES. BANK CLEV. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.safeguardproperties.com/News/
Community_Initiatives/2014/03/Cleveland_Federal_Reserve_Estimates_Impact_of_FastTracking_Foreclosures_in_OH_PA.aspx.
190 FLA. STAT. § 45.031(1)(a) (West Supp. 2015).
191 Id.
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schedule the sale within 120 days of the sheriff’s receipt of any writ of
execution, but it later creates a loophole for the same lender to apply for a hold
on the sale.192
Indiana’s statute parallels Florida’s but with one key difference: it does not
permit a lender to modify the time frame for the sale.193 Rather, the Indiana
Code provides that the sheriff shall schedule the sale to occur no later than 120
days after the final judgment.194 The language of the code provides additional
safeguards by requiring written notice to the borrower when the sale of the
mortgaged property is cancelled and imposing the cost of sending the notice on
the party cancelling the sale.195 It is possible that the effect of a zombie
mortgage could be negated by a borrower’s knowledge that the property is still
rightfully under his or her name, regardless of whether he or she has vacated it
or remained on the property.
Despite the need for statutes that establish a maximum time period within
which a lender must conduct a foreclosure sale, importance must also be
placed on creating statutes that empower local courts to deal with zombie
mortgages. One of the most illustrative examples is New York’s statute for
want of prosecution.196 Under this statute, when a party “unreasonably neglects
to proceed” or delays the prosecution of another party, “the court, on its own
initiative or upon motion, . . . may dismiss the party’s pleadings on terms.”197
This statute targets three issues applicable to zombie mortgages: it sets specific
requirements before a court can proceed with such dismissal, it creates a cause
of action for a borrower by allowing his petition for dismissal, and it
establishes an explicit delegation of power for courts presiding over
foreclosure cases to dismiss such action.198

192

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-64(a)(3) (West 2014). The statute requires the sheriff to schedule a sale
within 120 days: lenders often interpret “schedule” to mean that they must only schedule the sale by such
deadline, and not necessarily conduct the sale.
193 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-3 (West 2015).
194 Id. § 32-29-7-3(c)(1).
195 Id. § 32-29-7-3(i).
196 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3216 (McKinney Supp. 2015).
197 Id. § 3216(a).
198 Id. § 3216(b).
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C. Legislative Action in Both Judicial and Nonjudicial Post-Auction Zombie
Mortgages
In both judicial and nonjudicial jurisdictions, the primary concern regarding
post-auction zombie mortgages involves a lender’s failure to execute and
record the deed of sale after a foreclosure sale has taken place.199 In the event a
property’s value is below the outstanding debt—and there are no bidders at the
auction—a lender may likely tender a bid on its own behalf, or on behalf of a
related entity, at its own foreclosure sale.200 When this occurs, lenders could
forgo executing and recording the deed after the sale to avoid issues of
ownership and legal liability.201 Both kinds of post-auction zombie mortgages
create uncertainty in the minds of the public regarding ownership of the
property. This section focuses on two factors permitting lenders to delay
finalizing the sale: (1) ambiguity as to what constitutes the completion of the
foreclosure sale, and (2) vague statutory timelines for the execution of the deed
of sale.
1. Ambiguity as to What Constitutes the Completion of the Sale
Ambiguity as to what constitutes the completion of a foreclosure sale has
enabled lenders to play a real estate shell game with regard to ownership of the
property. Lenders have long held onto the idea that recording a deed, as
opposed to its execution and delivery, constitutes the last step to finalize the
sale.202 Yet, cities can look to the recording acts to argue that a lender’s
belief—that by refusing to record the deed it will avoid becoming the owner
after the foreclosure sale203—is incorrect.
The legal fallacy is challenged by the fact that, by virtue of the recording
acts, recording the deed after a foreclosure sale only serves to promote
“notoriety of land ownership and preserve the muniments of title by

199

See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1185.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 44, at 5–6.
201 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1185 (explaining how such lenders usually wait until they can find a
seller before executing the deed in such interested party’s name); Kelly, supra note 174, at 226 (“Lenders had
developed their own strategies for avoiding direct liability for code violations. Sometimes they would
commence foreclosure proceedings in which they would buy the property at the sale but would not record a
deed until they were ready to sell the property.”).
202 Kelly, supra note 174, at 226.
203 Id.
200

CLARK GALLEYSPROOFS3

826

2/29/2016 1:42 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:795

encouraging grantees to record their deeds.”204 All recording does is make the
transfer public knowledge and determine priority rights between successive
grantees of the same grantor.205 Various jurisdictions, like Arkansas and
Colorado, have established that deeds for the transfer of real estate may be
recorded, which further supports the theory that recordation is not necessary to
transfer ownership to a lender.206
With no one contesting successive ownership rights in the zombie
mortgage scenario, courts must focus on what constitutes an effective transfer
of a property: whether it is the acceptance of a high bid or the execution of the
deed. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the acceptance of the high bid
alone is not sufficient to complete the foreclosure sale; rather, courts look for
acceptance of the high bid in conjunction with the transfer of the debtor’s right
to possession and the application of the sales proceeds.207 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Georgia has held “that the foreclosure is complete only upon
acceptance of bid, execution and delivery of a deed under power of sale and
transfer of consideration.”208 In New York, a grant of real estate takes effect
only after its delivery and execution, suggesting that the high bid is insufficient
on its own to transfer ownership.209
2. Vague Statutory Timelines for Finalizing the Sale Enable Lenders to
Delay the Transfer
The absence of statutory guidelines—time limits on the execution, delivery
and recordation of the deed after the auction takes place—enables lenders to
delay finalizing the sale.210 Connecticut, for example, has no statutory

204 John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guide for First Year Law Students,
80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91, 102 (2002).
205 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 202 (Supp. 2015) (stating that recordation prevents the party’s
defeasance by any other person other than the maker); Scheid, supra note 204, at 102 (“Without a recording
act, the grantee has no way of knowing whether the grantor truly possesses the interest he purports to have.”).
206 ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-209 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-109 (2015) (establishing that
Colorado also uses the permissive “may” for recordation).
207 Bldg. Block Enters. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 723 S.E.2d 467, 469–70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
208 Tampa Inv. Grp. Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Inc., 723 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 2012); FRANK S.
ALEXANDER, SARA J. TOERING & SARAH BOLLING MANCINI, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND
FORECLOSURE LAW § 8:8(a), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2015).
209 N.Y. REAL PROP. § 244 (McKinney 2006).
210 See FLA. STAT. § 45.031(1)(a) (West Supp. 2015), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.
cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0000-0099/0045/Sections/0045.031.html; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:5064(a)(3) (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-3 (West 2015).
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requirement for conducting a foreclosure sale; it only maintains that the
endorsement of the sale “should be delivered to the court as soon as
possible.”211 Unlike the Connecticut legislature, the Georgia legislature,
primarily guided by power-of-sale foreclosures, sought to solve this problem
by imposing a statutory requirement for the recordation of the deed within
ninety days of the sale.212 Though this statute was later enacted without
enforcement mechanisms or sanctions for noncompliance, earlier drafts of the
bill highlighted growing legislative desires to impose legal and financial
liability on lenders for delaying the execution and recordation of a deed of
sale.213
Aside from creating statutes that delineate the time frame for post-sale
recordation, a lone effort by the New Hampshire legislature has effectively
extracted the court’s theory in Carson214 and applied it to the execution of a
deed of sale.215 If a lender refuses to record the deed after a borrower has
requested its recordation, the New Hampshire statute would allow courts to
order a lender to record the deed of sale.216 The law states that if a person, or
lender, neglects or refuses to record the deed of sale within thirty days after
being requested to do so by a person having an interest in the mortgaged
property at issue, then the court can determine whether there is sufficient cause
for such neglect or refusal and has the power to either force the lender to
record such deed or commit the person to jail until such recordation is
performed.217
IV. HOW TO PREVENT ZOMBIE MORTGAGES
The differences between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions
highlight the fact that there is no single, standard solution for zombie
211 MICHELLE L. BIBEAU & MICHAEL D. O’CONNELL, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS AND FORECLOSURES IN CONNECTICUT § 9.5.3 (2012).
212 GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-14-160(a) (West. Supp. 2015).
213 H.R. 903, 2014 Gen. Assemb. § 3, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014) (describing how failure to comply with the
statutory requirements results in shifting any costs, fees, and fines incurred upon the property after the
scheduled sale date onto the lender). The proposed statute would have also prevented the creation of zombie
mortgages by allowing the borrower to remain on the property until the recordation of the sale. Id. § 2.
214 Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 859 N.W.2d 422, 432–33 (Wis. 2015) (holding that the court had the
power to force a lender to foreclose on a property if such lender had already invoked judicial action on the
same matter).
215 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:14 (2013).
216 Id.
217 Id.
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mortgages applicable in all jurisdictions. With respect to pre-auction zombie
mortgages in judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, eradication of zombie
mortgages can be accomplished by empowering courts to use equitable
discretion to force lenders to conduct a foreclosure sale after an untimely
delay, all while the state legislative branch creates mandatory maximum time
frames to supplement the judiciary’s efforts.218 For pre-auction zombie
mortgages in nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions, solutions center on the
creation of maximum statutory time frames to complete the foreclosure sale.
As for post-auction zombie mortgages in both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosures, state legislative branches can create statutes that both clarify what
constitutes the final step of the foreclosure sale and create a maximum time
period for execution and recordation after the auction is conducted.219 To
eradicate zombie mortgages, the state judicial and legislative branches need to
work together to require that the lender conduct and finalize the foreclosure
sale or lose its security interest on the mortgaged property. This Part addresses
the application of this solution in different jurisdictional contexts.
A. Solutions for Pre-Auction Zombie Mortgages in Judicial and Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Jurisdictions
Taking advantage of the built-in judicial role, judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions have a unique opportunity, both by statute or judicial decision, to
force a lender to conduct the foreclosure sale and impose maximum time
frames within which to conduct the sale.
Judicial foreclosure jurisdictions can empower courts to utilize their
equitable judicial discretion to foreclose the rights of a lender when it has
“slept on its right” to complete a foreclosure sale.220 As previously stated in
Boorstein v. Miller, the lender is obligated to use “diligence and reasonable
care to realize on the security of [such lender’s] mortgage.”221 The effects of a
lender’s uncompleted foreclosure sale parallels the effects of the lender’s
undue delay in Boorstein in that both the borrower and the city that fronts the
costs of the zombie mortgage eradication suffer at the hands of a lender who
has not used reasonable diligence to realize its security interest.222
218
219
220
221
222

See supra Part III.A–B.
See supra Part III.C.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 2012).
3 A.2d 87, 90 (N.J. Ch. 1938).
See id.
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Further, a lender violates the “diligence and reasonable care” standard in
Boorstein because it is negligent in filing a foreclosure action before
conducting its equity analysis.223 By filing a foreclosure action, a lender has
exercised its right to foreclose on the mortgaged property and should then be
subject to an obligation to use reasonable diligence to conduct the sale.224 Like
Boorstein, a lender’s failure to use reasonable diligence—to complete the
foreclosure sale after it has been judicially authorized—would prevent it from
realizing its security interest in the mortgaged property.225 Courts faced with
potential zombie mortgage actions should first determine whether a foreclosure
delay has been unreasonable, unjust, and unwarranted.226
But the premise of judicial equitable discretion has grown since Boorstein.
Growing support for judicial equitable discretion suggests that courts can
continue to use and tailor this action to effectively combat zombie mortgages.
Consequently, courts can, and should, use equitable discretion to effectively
force a lender to conduct and complete a foreclosure sale that has already been
judicially authorized.
To implement this solution, this Comment first looks to In re Pigg, which
held that a bankruptcy court has authority to order the sale of the property
when it found that the lender had consented to it through inaction. As applied
to zombie mortgages, courts could reason that lenders who failed to act to
conduct the sale after judicial authorization consented to the sale of the
property through their inaction.227 Similarly, In re Perry provides guidance in
judicial foreclosure jurisdictions by suggesting that courts can give the option
of foreclosing in a timely manner or accepting a quitclaim deed of the
property.228
The decisions in In re Pigg and In re Perry pave the way for the holding of
Carson. The decision in Carson demonstrates that a court can intervene and
require the lender to complete the foreclosure proceeding that it started
voluntarily.229 Taken a step further, this Comment suggests that if a lender
223
224
225
226
227

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 6, at 15.
See Boorstein, 3 A.2d at 91.
Id.
See id. at 90.
See Pigg, v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.

2011).
228
229

No. 12-01633-8-RDD, 2012 WL 4795675, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012).
See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 859 N.W.2d 422, 432 (Wis. 2015).
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failed to conduct the sale within a certain number of days from the date of the
court order, then the same court would have to either force the lender to
conduct the sale or could dismiss the case with prejudice. Otherwise, as the
Carson court highlighted, the result would give lenders an indefinite time
period within which to conduct the sale.230
Employing this modified equitable discretion doctrine should result in the
dismissal of the foreclosure action—though this dismissal would not
automatically clarify the title worries that encompass the zombie mortgage
crisis—or the release of the security interest in the mortgaged property.
Forcing the completion of the sale would have a stronger effect on zombie
mortgages because dismissing the action would likely trigger a circular statute
of limitations problem,231 where a lender would simply have to re-file for
foreclosure and the property might remain abandoned in the interim.232 A
lender would also be able to wait to file for foreclosure until the end of the
statute of limitations period, often years from the date of dismissal.233 Though
a dismissal with prejudice might seem to solve this problem at first glance—
assuming it bars a lender from filing a new foreclosure action after its undue
delay in completing the first sale—such type of dismissal does not actually
preclude a lender from initiating a new foreclosure proceeding.234
Accordingly, the most effective solution leaves lenders with two choices:
conduct and complete the foreclosure sale, or risk losing the security interest in
the property. Releasing the security interest would prevent lenders from later
foreclosing on the same mortgaged property235 while providing an incentive
for such lenders to undertake an equity analysis prior to filing for
foreclosure.236 But, insofar as there is doubt of the equitable power of a judge
to deem a security interest released of record, the simplest solution is to
explicitly delineate such judicial authority in the statutory amendments.
230

Carson, 859 N.W.2d at 430.
See supra note 187 and its accompanying text.
232 Afolabi v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
233 See supra note 187 and its accompanying text.
234 Afolabi, 849 N.E.2d at 1173 (holding that there was neither res judicata or claim preclusion preventing
the lender from initiating a new foreclosure action after previous foreclosure have been dismissed with
prejudice or lost in summary judgment).
235 Releasing the security interest on the mortgaged property would mean that a lender has unsecured debt
at most. As the holder of unsecured debt, a lender’s only avenue of recuperating the outstanding balance of the
loan would be to sue the borrower on the underlying promissory note, if permitted by the respective
jurisdiction.
236 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 6, at 10.
231
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Though this solution takes a drastic approach, it is not a wide deviation
from other zombie mortgage eradication proposals. For example, the Home
Foreclosure Procedures Act237 aims to authorize courts to dismiss, stay, or bar
future foreclosure actions on the same property when the lender commits a
material violation of the act, such as undue delay in conducting the foreclosure
sale and failure to act in good faith.238 Courts would determine whether a
lender’s violation would “unfairly burden the homeowner,” and, since the
proposed act does not define the parameters of “unfair burden,” judges would
have infinite discretion to define the term.239
This Comment is not suggesting that courts should eliminate all of a
borrower’s debt liability held by a lender.240 Rather, it is encouraging courts to
invoke equitable discretion only when a lender voluntarily commences a
foreclosure action and later delays the foreclosure sale, creating confusion with
regards to legal ownership of the mortgaged property.241 Judicial application of
equitable discretion would be a fair and effective solution because, even if a
lender’s own delay results in the relinquishment of its security interest, the
lender may still have the option of personally suing the borrower for liability
under the promissory note.242 At the very least, canceling a lender’s security
interest through equitable discretion serves as an incentive for the lender to not
delay the foreclosure sale.243

237 The Uniform Law Commission, a group of non-profit judges, lawyers, and state legislators, is drafting
the act. To be effective, the act would need to be passed by each respective state legislature. Kate Berry, Banks
Halting Foreclosures to Avoid Upkeep, AM. BANKER (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/
178_78/banks-halting-foreclosures-to-avoid-upkeep-1058558-1.html.
238 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT
§ 7019(a) (Draft 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Real%20Estate%20Mortgage
%20Foreclosure%20Process%20and%20Protections/2014nov_HFPA_Mtg%20Draft_Clean.pdf.
239 See Letter from Laurence E. Platt, K&L Gates, to William R. Breetz, Jr., Chairman, Unif. Law
Comm’n Drafting Comm., at 2 (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20
Real%20Estate%20Mortgage%20Foreclosure%20Process%20and%20Protections/2014nov13_HFPA_Comme
nts_Platt.pdf.
240 See Mitchell v. Auto. Owners Indem. Underwriters, 118 P.2d 815 (Cal. 1941) (holding that the bar on
the statute of limitations affects only the remedy and does not impair the obligation).
241 See generally Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 859 N.W.2d 422, 432 (Wis. 2015) (holding that the
circuit court had the power and discretion to order the lender to sell the property within a certain period of time
when the lender had voluntarily commenced foreclosure).
242 Finley, supra note 55.
243 The idea behind this is that a lender will be dissuaded from delaying the completion of the sale if it
otherwise would lose its security interest. Because a lender stands to lose its security, the assumption is that it
will either (1) complete the sale if it believes it to be even slightly financially beneficial, or (2) walk away from
the security interest, release it, and increase the alienability of the blighted property.
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But it is likely that judicial intervention on its own will lack the necessary
power to prevent future zombie mortgages from developing. In conjunction
with judicial intervention, several legislative changes are necessary to fully
eradicate zombie mortgages. First, state legislatures could introduce statutory
time frames detailing the maximum length of time a lender has to conduct the
auction after receiving a judgment authorizing the sale.244 Though this
Comment does not suggest that the same length of time might work for all
jurisdictions, some states have previously proposed a ninety-day time frame to
conduct the sale after receipt of the court’s judgment.245 To create effective
time frames for the completion of the sale, it might be imperative for
legislatures to analyze the average length of time during which the unoccupied
property becomes blighted in that respective jurisdiction. It might also be
beneficial to identify permissible, reasonable delays by a lender, taking into
consideration their efforts to locate a new buyer and to auction the property in
a timely manner. Creating a statutory maximum time frame that ignores
reasonable delays by a lender might only muster more opposition from lenders
and hinder its passage.246
Ideally, the statute created would eliminate the loopholes that enable
lenders to indefinitely extend the sales period.247 Primarily, state legislatures
should seek to eliminate statutory language that permits lenders to unilaterally
extend the time frame to complete the sale.248 By requiring both lender and
borrower to consent to the delay of the sale, legislatures would essentially
impose a notification requirement as well as lessen the likelihood of extending
the sale time frame.249
Further, legislatures need to create statutes that expand the power of the
judiciary and better enable it to either dismiss the foreclosure action or force a
lender to conduct the foreclosure sale. By creating a comprehensive outline of
courts’ powers, the legislature could eliminate ambiguity as to what courts can
do to eradicate zombie mortgages. Not only would this enhance uniformity for
future court decisions, but it would also decrease lenders’ risky delay tactics
244 See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text (discussing the few jurisdictions that have enacted
some form of legislative constraint on delayed foreclosure sale as well as their shortcomings).
245 S.B. 275, 115th General Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
246 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1246 n.437 (describing lenders’ lobbying efforts to thwart attempts to
impose duties on lenders to maintain vacant properties).
247 See supra Part III.B.
248 See FLA. STAT. § 45.031(1)(a) (West Supp. 2015).
249 See id.; H.R. 903, 2014 Gen. Assemb. § 3, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014).
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because they could anticipate that courts will not rule in their favor in the face
of such blatant nonfeasance.
Specifically, the new statutes would give courts the power to levy sanctions
such as the release of the security interest in the mortgaged property. To make
this effective, the statutory language would need to deem the security interest
ineffective at the expiration of the statutory period within which to conduct the
sale. For example, if the statutory maximum time frame requires the sale to be
conducted within 120 days of the judgment authorizing the foreclosure sale,
then a lender’s failure to comply with the time frame would make the security
interest invalid on the 121st day after the judgment was entered.
Even if the state legislature fails to incorporate explicit statutory language
permitting judges to release the security interest in the mortgaged property, the
two-part coalition between the state judicial and legislative branches could still
collectively improve time-frame ambiguity and judicial equitable discretion,
thereby achieving the desired result: judicial enforcement of a maximum
statutory time frame to force lenders to conduct the auction after it is judicially
authorized. Both releasing the security interest in the mortgaged property and
requiring the completion and finalization of the sale eradicate confusion as to
ownership of the property—the primary externality created by zombie
mortgages.
Further, abandoned property receivership ordinances have played a
significant role in enabling community members to take action and correct
property blight in their neighborhoods.250 Using state statutes to create
third-party standing for community members creates a more effective system
for maintaining the vacant properties.251 Neighbors, driven partly by austerity
and partly by the negative effect of the vacant property on their own home
valuations, are encouraged to repair the property.252 The idea behind this
strategy is that the earlier a receiver can fix and maintain the property, the
lesser the cost of repairs and damage suffered by the community.253 By
bringing an action for receivership separate from that of a lender, community
members can ensure that the community itself is not harmed by a lender’s

250

See Kelly, supra note 174, at 217.
Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. This Comment acknowledges that an inherent weakness of even a strong receivership statute is the
lack of available funds to remediate the defects of vacant homes.
251
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decision to delay a foreclosure sale.254 Additionally, the super-priority status of
a receiver’s lien facilitates the sale of the property and potentially clears the
title from subordinate liens.255 A receiver’s super-priority lien would facilitate
the transfer of rehabilitated property—by eliminating a lender’s lien on the
property through a properly conducted foreclosure sale—and prevent
ownership confusion.256
Though other possible approaches are available, such as imposing criminal
sanctions on lenders or creating statutory notice requirements for a borrower
regarding the status of the foreclosure sale,257 this Comment explains how
these tactics are insufficient to decrease the number of zombie mortgages
currently in existence.258 Judicial foreclosure jurisdictions demand the two-part
approach this Comment puts forth.
Though the discussion in this subsection has focused on solutions for
pre-auction zombie mortgages in judicial jurisdictions, the legislative solutions
outlined for the former are similar to the solutions proposed for pre-auction
zombie mortgages in nonjudicial jurisdictions. In nonjudicial foreclosure
jurisdictions, it is imperative for legislatures to create maximum statutory time
frames for the completion of the foreclosure sale. Similar to the legislative goal
in judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, primarily nonjudicial states should seek to
eliminate statutory loopholes that enable lenders to delay conducting the sale.
These jurisdictions would also benefit from clear, statutory sanctions for
non-compliance with the maximum time frame.

254

Id.
Id.
256 See id.; Johnson, supra note 10, at 1186–87.
257 Such notice requirement would encourage the borrower to remain on the property until the foreclosure
sale is officially completed. For an example of proposed statutory notice requirements, see H.R. 903, 2014
Gen. Assemb. § 2, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014). The Bank of America consent judgment, part of the National
Mortgage Settlement, declares that if a lender makes a determination not to pursue foreclosure action on a
property, then it is obligated to notify the borrower of a lender’s release of the lien, the decision not to
foreclose, and the borrower’s right to remain in possession of the property. Order Consent Judgment, United
States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-0361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/
documents/ scra_boa_settle.pdf.
258 See Martin, supra note 65.
255
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B. Judicial and Nonjudicial Foreclosure Solutions for Post-Auction Zombie
Mortgages
Because post-auction zombie mortgages in judicial jurisdictions are similar
to post-auction zombie mortgages in nonjudicial jurisdictions,259 both types of
zombie mortgages can be eradicated by: (1) drafting statutes that both clarify
what constitutes the final step in the foreclosure sale and that create a
maximum time frame for executing and recording the deed of sale after the
auction is conducted, and (2) imposing heavier sanctions on noncompliant
lenders.260 In judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, an additional solution is
available: empowering courts to force lenders to record the deed after the sale
occurs.
First, though it is likely that the acceptance of a lender’s bid does not
constitute the perfection of the sale,261 jurisdictions would greatly benefit from
being more transparent about the execution and recordation requirements.
Establishing a clear rule that determines the point at which the transfer is
complete facilitates the creation of the maximum time frame for recordation.
Despite the fact that recordation of the deed of sale is not essential to the
completion of a foreclosure sale,262 such failure to record nonetheless
exacerbates legal ownership problems.263 If a foreclosure sale were completed
with the acceptance of the high bid, the transfer would still pose a series of
problems in identifying the legal owner of a mortgaged property, since the
borrower would still be the owner of record264—though, in theory, this method
would more easily pass ownership onto a lender who bid on the property but
failed to record the deed of sale. While equating the high bid with the
completion of the sale is enticing, this inability to trace ownership (due to
failure to record) prevents the city from communicating with the legal owner,
which could encourage blight.265

259

See supra notes 199–200 (demonstrating the similarities between post-auction zombie mortgages in
judicial foreclosure jurisdictions and general zombie mortgages in nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions).
260 See supra notes 189–93 and its accompanying text.
261 Scheid, supra note 204, at 102.
262 See id. (explaining that recording acts only affect priority and do not affect the rights of the grantee
against the grantor).
263 Johnson, supra note 10, at 1186–87.
264 Id.
265 Id.
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Further, statutory time frames for executing and recording the deed of
sale—after the auction is conducted—are crucial to preventing delays in
completing the sale, particularly if recordation (and not the high bid) is
considered the mark of property ownership transfer. Some jurisdictions have
anticipated the problems arising from the failure to record the deed of sale and
have required the deed to be recorded within sixty days of the execution and
delivery of such deed.266 State legislatures need to incorporate a statutory
provision similar to that of New Hampshire, which bestows power on its courts
to order lenders to record the deed of sale if the lender neglects or refuses to
record within 30 days after being requested to do so by an interested party.267
Georgia’s statute, requiring recordation of the deed of sale within ninety days
of the sale, is also a strong starting point for other legislatures looking to create
recordation time frames.268 Legislatures drafting these time frames should
avoid common pitfalls, such as permitting a one-sided extension of the time
frame for the benefit of the lender.
In judicial foreclosure jurisdictions only, judges should also use the
rationale in Carson to order the sheriff conducting the foreclosure sale to bring
the deed to be recorded shortly after the sale occurs.269 Because criminal
sanctions have not been particularly effective on lenders,270 this Comment
suggests that an ideal statute would permit courts to force lenders in its
jurisdiction to record the deed but would deviate from New Hampshire’s
criminal alternative271 by permitting courts to also record the deed of sale in
the lender’s name.272
266

S.B. 3104, 98th General Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:14 (2013). Though the statute allows a court to issue a warrant, bring a
person before the jurisdiction of the court, and order him to record the deed, such judicial action may be
pursued only after a person having an interest in the property requests recordation and the person holding the
unrecorded deed fails to act within thirty days of such request. Id.
268 GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-14-160(a) (West. Supp. 2015).
269 See also Sam Spatter, Some Banks Don’t Record Deed in Foreclosure, Neglect Property, TRIBLIVE
(July
4,
2013,
12:01
AM),
http://triblive.com/business/headlines/3945229-74/property-deedbanks#axzz3EIB6viQV (explaining that a new Allegheny County ordinance states that “when the time period
expires and [the lender has not] sold the property, the sheriff’s officer will bring the deeds to be recorded with
the $150 recording fee”).
270 Johnson, supra note 10, at 1195–96 (stating that lenders often evade criminal summons).
271 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:14 (2013).
272 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 1249 n.458 (“A bill pending at the [Rhode Island] Statehouse
would require the sheriff to quickly register the deeds of those buying property at the sheriff’s sales—usually
lenders foreclosing on loans—making it easier to find those responsible for the houses.” (quoting Mark
Ferenchik, Foreclosure's Ripple Effects: Who Owns Problem Homes?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2007, at
Al)).
267
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Second, imposing stricter sanctions on noncompliant lenders would
improve the statute’s enforceability by giving lenders another incentive to
complete the sale. Similar to the legislative solutions for pre-auction zombie
mortgages, an effective sanction might involve statutory language that would
deem the security interest in the mortgaged property ineffective at the
expiration of the recordation period.
C. Implications
The two-part approach put forth—combining legislative and judicial
resources to force a lender to complete the foreclosure sale at the risk of losing
its security interest on the property—will not only facilitate foreclosure
proceedings, it will also clarify legal ownership of a mortgaged property at
every stage in the proceedings. Additionally, due to the severe consequences a
lender faces for its failure to complete the sale, the solutions proposed might
decrease the probability that a lender will file a foreclosure action without first
conducting the equity analysis273 or without being fully committed to seeing
the action to the end.
Yet, it is possible that each court’s ability to rule on whether the delay can
be considered unjustified and unreasonable could create ambiguity as to the
threshold length of time that constitutes an unreasonable sale delay.274 This
seemingly subjective determination could potentially be solved by drafting
comprehensive definitions for abandonment and blight: if the property meets
either threshold275 after the foreclosure sale has been postponed, then the court
presiding over the foreclosure sale could proceed with an order to force the
lender to complete the sale at the risk of losing its security interest in the
property.
Despite its potential to abolish zombie mortgages, this Comment’s
approach will likely have some critics. One key point of criticism might be this
273

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 6, at 15.
This recognizes that equitable discretion of one judge will differ from that of another judge. See
Boorstein v. Miller, 3 A.2d 87, 90–91 (N.J. Ch. 1938). But cf. Anabarasan v. 53-54 Palisades Hudson Assoc.,
LLC, No. L-63-09, 2012 WL 1108418 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2012) (distinguishing the case where
defendants could not show the sort of prejudice suffered by the Guarantor in Boorstein from the lender’s
failure of notice).
275 See generally CHULA VISTA, CAL., MUN. CODE. §§ 15.60.040–15.60.050 (2008), http://www.cacities.
org/UploadedFiles/LeagueInternet/5c/5cbdbacd-10fb-4407-9644-30a521011297.pdf
(describing
specific
conditions of vacant and blighted property, including overgrown vegetation, accumulated mail, trash, and other
debris).
274
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Comment’s extension of equitable judicial discretion to force a lender to act in
a manner contrary to its rights.276 This Comment, however, has differentiated
between judicial actions forcing a lender to foreclose when it had not yet filed
for foreclosure from actions forcing a lender to foreclose when it has already,
voluntarily, come under the jurisdiction of the presiding court.277 Unlike the
former use of judicial action—rejected for its broad scope—the latter use is
carefully curtailed, designed to incentivize lenders who earlier petitioned the
court for a foreclosure judgment on the property but then wastefully depleted
judicial resources when they decided to abandon the sale and leave the court’s
docket in limbo.
CONCLUSION
Homeowner Joseph Keller and many others like him are haunted daily by
the effects of zombie mortgages.278 Keller, in particular, was hit with bills for
back taxes, property maintenance, and the outstanding balance of the debt,
which has continued to accrue interest, after finding out that he was still legally
liable for his home in Columbus, Ohio.279 Like many homeowners facing
foreclosures, Keller was not in a financial position to pay back increasing fines
for city code violations or city taxes owed on the property.280
Keller’s situation is commonplace today. Though the rate of zombie
mortgages is slowly decreasing as the problem garners more attention, it is still
a prevalent concern in about sixteen states and sixty metro areas.281 The
zombie mortgage numbers will remain steady as long as legislatures foster
ambiguous auction time frames, sale completion, and recordation
requirements.
In these situations, the party in the best position to avoid both
home-ownership limbo and the decay of the property is the lender. To curtail
the number of zombie mortgages, courts need to curb lenders’ refusal to
276 Conlin, supra note 1 (“Banks say that because they are not the legal owners of these homes, they aren’t
required to maintain them, pay taxes on them, or take any legal responsibility for them.”).
277 Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In
re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (emphasis added).
278 Conlin, supra note 1.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Quentin Fottrell, Zombie Foreclosures Rise in 16 States and 60 Metro Areas, MARKETWATCH (Oct.
30, 2014, 12:02 AM), www.marketwatch.com/story/zombie-foreclosures-rise-in-16-states-and-60-metro-areas2014-20-30.
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complete the foreclosure sale by requiring the timely completion of the process
once the action is filed, and only giving lenders the alternative of releasing the
security interest on the mortgaged property. It seems inequitable to allow
lenders to benefit from the strategic delay while borrowers and municipalities
bear the cost of a lender’s inaction.
This Comment has argued that judicial equitable discretion can bar a lender
from enforcing its rights to the security interest on a mortgaged property when
a lender has strategically delayed a foreclosure sale it voluntarily commenced.
The equitable doctrine serves to provide some justice to borrowers who would
be otherwise be continually, and indefinitely, liable for the decay and repair of
a property they no longer possess. More importantly, this doctrine and the
approaches that flow from it would help clarify who has legal ownership of the
property, a problem that is at the heart of the zombie mortgage crisis.
Though the zombie mortgage crisis seems daunting to localities and
municipalities suffering from it, there are many available judicial and
nonjudicial solutions to decrease the number of blighted properties. This
Comment urges these entities to take affirmative steps to prevent foreclosure
limbo by enacting changes in maximum foreclosure time frames, and by
encouraging courts to utilize their equitable judicial discretion. The suggested
solutions would likely require increased judicial oversight at the outset of the
proceedings, but it would substantially decrease the number of backlogged
cases and blighted properties. Without implementing immediate changes, as
suggested by this Comment, stories like Keller’s will be replicated across more
states and, soon, many homeowners will also find themselves victims of the
real estate walking dead.
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